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Settling Prosecution Costs on the Offender:
How the Rights Are Priced in Illinois
Governmental authority to assess against a convicted defendant the
costs accrued incident to his prosecution originated by legislative fiat;
the imposition of costs upon the convicted party in a criminal action
did not exist at common law.' In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the
practice evolved in 18th century England in derogation of prior custom which obliged the private complainant 2 to bear all costs arising
in a criminal proceeding.' Current prevalence of the practice of costs
taxation against convicted offenders in this country, at least as a mat4
ter of record, is indicated by the fact that the federal government
and the governments of most states 5 have enacted statutory schemes
requiring imposition of such costs as a part of the judgment in criminal proceedings.
Examination of these diverse statutory provisions reveals that an
extensive range of expenses incident to criminal proceedings, includ1. Moore v. People, 37 I1. App. 641 (1890). The scope of statutory cost assessment enactments is a wholly legislat ve determination.
The common law does not authorize taxing or allowing costs in any case, and
hence in this State judgments for costs must rest upon statutes. Where the
Legislature has not authorized them they should not be awarded.
Galpin v. City of Chicago, 249 I11.554, 556, 94 N.E. 961, 965 (1911).
2. This practice persists in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-49,
6-50 (1973), which require the complainant to bear all costs of the prosecution where
the couit determines there was not reasonable ground for the prosecution or that it was
not required by the public interest. Frivo-ous or malicious prosecutons may result in
imprisonment of the complainant.
3. Note, Criminal Costs Assessment in Missouri-Without Rhyme or Reason, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 76 [hereinafter cited as Without Rhyme or Reason]. This article contains
an interesting and extensive discussion of the evolution of legislative history of costs assessment, as influenced by Dickens, Fielding and other contemporary novelists.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1918 (1973) provides that costs be included in any judgment where
civil fines or forfeitures are imposed; imposition of costs upon a defendant convicted of
any noncavital offense is discretionary. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7201-03, 7206,
7210, 7213, 7215 require costs to be imposed upon conviction of certain enumerated offenses related to payment, collection and accounting for taxes.
5. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, §8 1221-34.1, 1261-65, 1291-95 (1973); W.
VA. CODE ANN., § 62-5-1 et seq. (1973); IDAHO CODE ANN., § 19-2517 (1973).
An
analysis of statutory provisions in jurisdictions throughout the country may be found in
Note, Criminal Law-Taxation of Court Costs, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1572 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Taxation of Court Costs].
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ing items such as docket fees,0 jurors' per diem or attendance
fees and mileage, 7 and per diem fees of government witnesses for
each day of attendance at trial whether or not the witness actually
testified on the day of attendance, 8 have been found properly taxable against convicted defendants.'
The underlying rationale for
obligating one convicted in a court of law to recompense the government for the time, resources and energy expended in securing his conviction is obvious: the offender, whose transgressions of society's laws
served as the impetus for mobilizing the state's criminal justice machinery against him, is the proper party to bear the financial burden
incurred.' °
Regardless of the validity of this rationale or the social efficacy of
its operation," implementation of the statutorily derived authority for
inclusion of prosecution costs as a part of a criminal judgment requires that such statutes be particularly drafted by the legislature and
periodically scrutinized by the judiciary to ascertain that current statutory provisions effectively further the goals of criminal justice administration. However, legislatures and courts have remained reticent in this matter, with the consequence that:
Despite the great increase in crime in recent years, antiquated
statutory provisions of pre-Civil war vintage, compounded by piecemeal enactments and 12amendments without repeal, are still in effect
in many of the states.
The basic Illinois provision mandating assessment of costs of
prosecution against convicted offenders is found in chapter 38, section 180-3 of the Illinois Revised Statutes:
When any person is convicted of an offense under any statute, or
at common law, the court shall give judgment that the offender
6. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 29 Wash. 57, 69 P. 392 (1902); State v. Hunter,
33 Iowa 361 (1871).
7. See, e.g., Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 673 (1851).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Hoxie, 8 Alaska 210 (1930).
9. Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 854 (1959).
10. Taxation of Court Costs, supra note 5, at 1573; Note, Charging Costs of Prosecution to the Defendant, 59 GEo. L.J. 991, 996 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Charging
Costs of Prosecution to the Defendant].
11. See Charging Costs of Prosecution, supra note 10. The author posits and evaluates various not-unrelated rationales expressed both explicitly and implicitly in judicial
opinions construing costs assessment provisions. These include: compensation to the
state and its officers, penalization to the offender as a part of his sentence and judicial
discouragement of unnecessary trials and the use of frivolous or otherwise wasteful trial
tactics. In early Illinois cases, courts frequently refer to the compensation basis for the
existence of costs assessment statutes. The grounds set forth by Illinois courts for enforcement of these statutes is further discussed in the text accompanying notes 21
through 26 infra.
12. Note, Without Rhyme or Reason, supra note 3, at 79.
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pay the costs of the prosecution. s
This law, with the accompanying statutory scheme enacted for its

implementation, 14 has been in effect with little change for a period of
more than 140 years. Repeal and piecemeal enactment of further
provisions which crucially relate to the functioning of costs assessment,
in the absence of concomitant legislative review of the costs assessment provisions, have rendered the scheme contradictory, unwieldy
and legally unintelligible.
So long as the circuit courts in Cook County ignored the mandates
of chapter 38, section 180-3 in rendering judgments in criminal
cases, the effect of this anachronistic statutory scheme remained moot.
However, a motion' 5 filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Criminal Division, on August 20, 1974 by the State's Attorney prayed
that the court enter judgment against the defendant convicted of robbery for costs incurred in the prosecution of the case. This motion
is indicative of recent policy pursued by the State's Attorney's Office
of Cook County that the state demand judgment for the costs of prosecution in all criminal cases thereafter prosecuted. 16 Revitalization
of this long-dormant statutory scheme necessitates analysis of provisions extant to determine whether implementation of this statutory
scheme inflicts upon convicted defendants any burdens forbidden by
the federal and state constitutions. This article seeks to perform this
requisite analysis, as well as to reconcile, as far as possible, outmoded
and contradictory provisions, to promulgate specific proposals for revision, and to posit a proposed statutory scheme for costs assessment
which eliminates any constitutionally objectionable practices possibly
17
ordained by the current statutory system.
13.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-3 (1973).
14. See text accompanying notes 63 through 64 infra.
15. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FOR COSTS, People v. James L. Hickman, Indictment No.
74-2887, filed August 20, 1974 [hereinafter cited as People v. Hickman].
16. Current practice in the Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County limits demand for judgment for costs to cases where the defendant is deemed not indigent and
has been released on bond. For further discussion of the determination of indigency
for purposes of costs assessment, see pp. 368-73 infra.
17. This article presents no analysis of the social utility of the practice of assessing
against convicted persons the costs incurred in their prosecutions. For inquiry into similar statutory provisions authorizing criminal litigation expenses to be taxed to the offender and analysis of the desirability of the procedure in terms of social effect in other
jurisdictions, see Sachs, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge Them to Equal Protection, 27 MD. L. REV. 154 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Indigent Court Costs and Bai];
Comment, Reimbursement of Defense Costs as a Condition of Probation for Indigents,
67 MICH. L. REV. 1404 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Reimbursement of Defense Costs];
Note, fail Fees and Court Costs for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: An Examination
of the Tennessee Procedure, 35 TENN. L. REV. 74 (1967); Note, Kansas Court Costs:
The Quality of Mercy is Strained, 9 WASH. L.J. 87 (1969); Note, Without Rhyme or
Reason, supra note 3; Note, Taxation of Court Costs, supra note 5.
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THE ILLINOIS PROVISIONS

Illinois requires taxation of prosecution costs of all convicted offenders. 1 8 Further provisions set forth procedures for enforcement
of this law: attachment of a lien upon the property of the accused
at the time of indictment and execution and levy 30 days after conviction and judgment;' 9 acknowledgement of the judgment for costs by
the offender, with adequate sureties; 20 and, after all legal means have
been exhausted, release of indigents incarcerated for nonpayment from
pecuniary obligations arising from the judgment, upon a satisfactory
demonstration of inability to liquidate the judgment liability. 2
18. For further discussion, see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
180-4 (19/.3) piovi es:
The property, real and personal, of every person who shall be convicted of any
offense, shall be bound, and a lien is hereby created on the property, both real
and personal, of every such offender, not exempt from execution or attachment,
from the time of finding the indictment at least so far as will be sufficient to
pay the fine and costs of prosecution. The clerk of court in which the conviction is had shall upon the expiration of thirty (30) days after judgment is rendered issue an execution for any fine that remains unpaid, and all costs of conviction remaining unpaid; in wh ch execution shall be stated the day on which
the arrest was made, or indictment found, as the case may be. The execution
may be directed to the proper officer of any county in this State. The officer
to whom such execution is delivered shall levy the same upon all the estate,
real and personal, of the defendant (not exempt from execution) possessed by
him on the day of the arrest or finding the indictment, as stated in the execution and any such property subsequently acquired; and the property so levied
upon shall be advertised and sold in the same manner as in civil cases, with
the like rights to all parties that may be interested therein. It shall be no objection to the selling of any property under such execution, that the body of
the defendant is in custody for the fine or costs, or both.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-5 (1973) provides:
If the person convicted, together with one or more sufficient sureties, will acknowledge a judgment in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, for the
amount of the fine and costs, or the costs only, when no fine is imposed, the
court shall cause the same to be entered in full satisfaction of the fine and
costs, or costs, only, with a direction that if the judgment is not paid with n
five months from the time of entering the same, execution shall be issued
thereon; and the defendant shall, upon the entering of such judgment, be discharged from imprisonment on account of the fine or costs, but he shall not
thereby be discharged from any imprisonment which is made a part of his punishment not dependent upon the payment of the fine or costs. Such judgment
shall be a lien upon all the real estate of the persons acknowledging the same
from the date of its entry. If the judgment so entered is not paid within five
months from the entry it may be enforced by execution, in the same manner
as other judgments at law. Such judgments may be acknowledged in vacation
before the clerk of the court, and he may, in such case, approve the surety;
and a judgment so acknowledged shall have the same force and effect from the
date of entry as if entered in open court.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (1973) provides:
Whenever it shall be made satisfactorily to appear to the court, after all legal
means have been exhausted, that any person who is confined in jail for any
fine or costs of prosecution, for any criminal offense, hath no estate wherewith
to pay such f ne and costs, or costs only, it shall be the duty of the said court
to discharge such person from further imprisonment for such fine and costs,
which discharge shall operate as a complete release of such fine and costs:
Provided, that nothing herein shall authorize any person to be discharged from
imprisonment before the expiration of the time for which he may be sentenced
to be imprisoned, as part of his punishment.
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Judicial interpretation of the effect of operation of these provisions
upon an offender is restricted to a handful of cases, most of preWorld War I vintage. These early cases, in articulating the function
of costs assessment, advance the rationale that imposition of prosecution costs upon the convicted person is compensatory, serving as reimbursement to the state for certain trial expenditures. Liability of
the convicted offender for costs arises from the judgment as a matter
of course and is incidental to a judgment of conviction.2 2 The defendant is obliged, subject to his right to controvert the amount of
costs assessed, to recompense the state for energies and services expended in securing his conviction; 23 the liability is not deemed a penalty inflicted in addition to the sentence.2 4 Simply, statutes requiring costs assessment upon convicted persons serve as a burden-shifting device: the state imposes upon the convicted defendant, rather
than upon the government, the duty and liability of satisfying all
costs legally taxable in his case.2 5 The Illinois courts early separated
liability of the offender for costs arising from the judgment of conviction from the sentence subsequently inflicted by ruling26 that executive pardon, although clearly intended to remit the entire punishment, did not release the defendant from his obligation to recompense
the government in the form of costs payment.
Illinois courts have generally required strict construction of statutes
which impose costs; 27 therefore, a more precise delineation of the statutory term "costs of the prosecution" is a necessary preliminary to any
inquiry into the operation of the statute. "Costs," as used in criminal
cases, is distinguishable from "fees" in that costs are an allowance
for expenses specially and necessarily incurred in the prosecution of
the case, while fees serve as compensation allowed by statute to of22. Moody v. People, 20 Ill. 315 (1858).
See also Carpenter v. People, 8 I1. (3
Gilm.) 147, 149 (1846), where the court stated:
The general principle on the subject of costs is. that the party who requires
an officer to perform services, for which compensation is allowed, is, in the
first instance, liable therefor.
23. Corbin v. People, 52 Il. Ann. 355 (1893).
24. In contrast to these early Illinois opinions discussing the liability of the convicted
offender for costs incurred in his prosecution as solely incidental to the judgment of conviction is Kennedy v. People, 122 ill. 649, 13 N.E. 213 (1887). The court, after assenting to the notion that costs serve compensatory purposes by describing costs as incident to the prosecution of the proceeding, approvingly quoted in dicta a passage indicating that costs form a proper part of the penalty inflicted upon conviction. No other
reference to the imposition of costs as a part of the offender's punishment is found in
either prior or subsequent reported Illinois cases.
25. Corbin v. People, 52 Il1. App. 355 (1893).
26. Holliday v. People, 10 ill. (5 Gilm.) 214 (1848).
27. Galpin v. City of Chicago, 249 111. 554, 566, 94 N.E. 961. 965 (1911). See
also Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1935).
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ficers of the court and to jurors or witnesses compelled to render
services during the progress of the cause.2 8 However, criminal costs
assessment statutes have rarely observed this distinction.2 9
The more critical distinction lies between "costs" and "fines."
Fines are thoroughly punitive and constitute as much a part of the

sentence imposed as punishment for the particular offense upon a
convicted defendant as does a term of imprisonment.8 0 Costs, by contrast, are imposed as a statutory reimbursement allowance to the
government. 1 Although this distinction is sometimes obscured by
courts,32 the disparity in the rationale underlying the imposition of
each obligation, necessitating different enforcement measures,33 warrants separation of the terms.
The statutory requirement of assessment of "costs of the prosecution"" has been generally construed35 by courts to exclude the ordi28. Bradley v. State, 69 Ala. 318 (1891).
29. Id.; see, e.g., Carpenter v. People, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 147 (1846); People v. Williams, 232 I11.
519, 83 N.E. 1047 (1908). See also People v. Kawoleski, 310 Ill. 498,
142 N.E. 169 (1924), where the court did not question taxing state's attorney's fees to
the convicted defendant as costs. Long ago, prior to legislative institution of salaries
for court and county officers, collection of fees from the convicted offender as costs was
a vital source of income for services rendered. See, e.g., Fosselman v. City of Springfield, 38 Ill. App. 296 (1890), ajf'd, 139 Ill. 185, 28 N.E. 916 (1891), where a justice
of the peace brought suit to recover from the city his fees arising in cases where the
convicted defendants were impoverished. Today, however, even though judicial and
county employees are no longer dependent upon costs collected from convicted defendants for their compensation, the taxing of certain fees as costs may perhaps be justified
as a means of protecting the state's coffers. Note, Litigation Costs: Hidden Barrier to
the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hidden Barrier to the Indigent].
This article includes both "fees" and "costs" in the term "costs."
30. In Holliday v. People, 10 fIl. (5 Gilm.) 214 (1848), the court held that gubernatorial pardon of an offender sentenced to imprisonment and to pay a fine excused such
payment, despite the contention of the state that the pardon was intended only to mitigate corporeal punishment. The pardon was found ineffective to relieve the offender
from payment of costs, however, because such costs are compensatory and do not share
a punitive cast.
31. Id. See text accompanying notes 22 through 29 supra.
32. Early Illinois opinions refer to "fines and costs" as related species of the same
concept, both being enforceable pecuniary obligations owed to the state; see, e.g., People
ex rel. Hoyne v. Windes, 283 Ill.
251, 119 N.E. 297 (1918).
33. These opinions do not articulate the notion that the difference between compelling the offender to pay the costs incurred in the prosecution of his case and inflicting
a fine upon him not only arises from wholly different considerations, but also is pertinent to proper disposition of the case. See pp. 354-68 infra.
34. As "prosecution" has been judicially defined, the defendant is liable for all allowable costs accruing from the time of institution of criminal proceedings against him, i.e.,
the time of indictment, rather than costs related only to the trial of his case. The court
in Corbin v. People, 52 Ill. App. 355, 356 (1893) stated:
A prosecution is defined to be the institution or commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment.
The United States Supreme Court concurred in this demarcation of "prosecution" in
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972):
The institution of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism.
It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For
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nary expenses inherent in the administration of justice and the maintenance of a court system, and to include only those expenses specific-

ally incurred in the prosecution of a particular case.

6

In, Illinois,

chapter 53,87 entitled "Fees And Salaries," sets the fees of various
court officers which may be assessed as costs in both civil and criminal proceedings, and includes fees taxable to recompense the state's
attorney, 3 8 the circuit court clerk," and the sheriff.4"
Illinois cases describe the operation of costs assessment in particular
circumstances. The imposition of costs by the court is mandatory 1
upon a judgment of conviction42 and may not be waived as an exercise of judicial discretion. However, the court may tax as costs only
those items specifically set forth in the applicable statute; further
it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only
then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.
It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement
of the "criminal prosecutions" ....
35. Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 854 (1959).
36. United States v. Murphy, 59 F.2d 734 (S.D. Ala. 1932).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53 (1973).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 8 (1973).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 51.1 (1973). In relation to fees of the circuit court
clerk, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 32 (1973) further provides for alternative payment from
the county treasury:
For swearing jurors and witnesses, or for any services in criminal cases not
hereinbefore enumerated, the clerk shall be allowed the same fees as in civil
cases; and in all criminal cases, when the costs cannot be collected from the
defendants on their conviction, or when the defendants shall be acquitted, such
costs shall be paid to the clerk from the county treasury.
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 71 (1973). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53 (1973) further
authorizes compensation for per diem and mileage expenses to jurors in section 62 and
to witnesses in section 65. The county is statutorily responsible for compensating jurors
for per diem and mileage expenses, under section 62. The State's Attorney's Office of
Cook County does not currently assess per diem and mileage expenses of either jurors
or witnesses. See APPENDIX. But see note 194 infra. Section 65 requires the county
to bear the expense of per diem and travelling expenses in criminal cases where the witness is subpoenaed from a foreign county or state. It is not clear that the per diem
and mileage expenses of witnesses who are residents of the county in which the criminal
trial is held are not taxable to the convicted defendant. The only Illinois case on point,
Corbin v. People, 52 Ill. App. 355 (1893), holding the convicted offender liable for the
fees of witnesses who were residents of foreign counties, has clearly been overruled by
section 65.
41. People v. Harris, 97 Ill. App. 2d 288, 240 N.E.2d 123, cert. denied, 395 U.S.
985 (1968); People v. Barringer, 22 Ill. App. 3d 168, 317 N.E.2d 331 (1974). The
statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-3 (1973) (emphasis added), provides that "the
court shall give judgment." In construing statutes, courts have generally held that the
word "shall" is mandatory, particularly when the word is addressed to a public official.
People v. Liddell, 19 Ill. App. 3d 794, 313 N.E.2d 248 (1974).
42. Acquitted defendants sustain no liability for costs. Wells v. McCullock, 13 Ill.
606 (1852); Heist v. People, 56 Ill. App. 391 (1894). Although the court in Carpenter
v. People, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 147 (1846) found the defendant obligated to pay costs accrued during his trial and appeal to the supreme court even though his conviction was
reversed, this result would not obtain today: an accused is not required to advance any
payment of costs. McArthur v. Artz, 129 Ill. 352, 21 N.E. 802 (1889). Judgment on
appeal in favor of the accused precludes assessment of state's attorney's and clerk's fees.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, §§ 8, 32 (1973).
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assessment by the court is an abuse of judicial discretion warranting
reversal on the costs issue.43 When several defendants are jointly
tried, each defendant is liable only for the costs particularly attributed
to the prosecution of his case; the costs must be apportioned among
offenders, and the costs of prosecuting defendants acquitted in the
cause are taxable to no convicted defendant. 44 But where an offender is tried and convicted upon a multi-count indictment, the state's
attorney's fees are taxed on each count in the indictment resulting
46
No reciprocal
in conviction,4 5 up to the statutory maximum of ten.
of costs alform
right of compensation vests in the defendant in the
lowances against the state in the event of his acquittal of the charges
47
against him.

Procedurally, the assessment of costs is implemented by issue of
an order 48 and execution 49 by the clerk against the property of the
defendant upon judgment. The defendant may then controvert the
accuracy of the assessment by motion to quash the order for costs.",
In the event of nonpayment, the execution is levied by the proper
43. In People v. Parks, 216 111. App. 529 (1920), an information charged defendant
with negligence and refusal to pay support and maintenance amounts to his wife, necessitating a criminal proceeding because proof of guilt was required beyond a reasonable
doubt. Upon a finding of guilt by the jury, the court taxed $40 to the defendant as
costs, that sum representing the $15 statutory amount allowed under ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
53, § 8 to the state's attorney as well as a $25 fee for the wife's attorney. The appellate
court reversed, holding inter alia that the assessment of fees of the wife's attorney was
error:
The taxing of the fee of $25 for attorney Denton as part of the costs of this
proceeding was clearly without warrant of law. The statute under which this
information was filed does not provide for the assessment of attorney's fees as
costs.
216 III. App. at 533; cf. People e rel. Henderson v. Redfern, a quo warranto act on,
104 II1.App. 2d 132, 136, 243 N.E.2d 252, 254 (1968):
Consideration of the propriety of assessing attorneys' fees is permissible only
where the statute specifically allows their assessment ....
44. Moody v. People, 20 I11.315 (1858); Kennedy v. People, 122 I11.649, 13 N.E.
213 (1887).
45. Borschenious v. People, 41 II1. 236 (1866); People v. Kawoleski, 310 Ill, 498,
142 N.E. 169 (1924).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 8 (1973).
47. People v. Pierce, 6 111. (1 Gilm.) 553 (1844); Galpin v. City of Chicago. 249
Ill. 554, 94 N.E. 961 (1911); People v. Summy, 377 I11.255, 36 N.E.2d 331 (1941);
People v. Rocco, 4 I11.App. 2d 238, 124 N.E.2d 25 (1955); People v. Fox, 7 111. App.
3d 707, 288 N.E.2d 500 (1972). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes
126 through 134 infra.
48. Carpenter v. People, 8 I11.(3 Gilm.) 147 (1846); Corbin v. People, 52 III. App.
355 (1893). The early Illinois opinions refer to the order as a "fee bill." See APPENDIX.

49. A lien is created upon all real and personal property of the offender, not otherwise exempt from attachment or garnishment, from the time of indictment. ILL. REV.
The text of this statute is set forth at note 19 supra.
STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973).
50. People v. Borschen~ous, 41 Ill. 236 (1866). However, entry of a confession of
judgment, under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-5 (1973), note 20 supra, by the offender
and his sureties estops the offender from disputing the accuracy of the assessment at
a later time. Lambert v. People, 43 Il1.App. 223 (1892).
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county officer 30 days after judgment upon property of the offender
sufficient to satisfy the judgment for costs."
Of crucial concern, however, is the fact that it remains wholly unclear whether any remedies are available under this statutory scheme
for costs assessment and enforcement where the offender lacks the
financial capability to satisfy the judgment for costs, through either
direct payment or criminal execution upon his property. Each enforcement provision in the statutory system for costs assessment presumes that the offender has already suffered incarceration, 5 2 yet
no statute extant enables the state to imprison a person upon involuntary default in payment of costs. Thus, the system of laws relating
to judgment for costs and subsequent enforcement of the judgment, as it currently exists, is not only incomplete, but utterly confusing and unintelligible as well. Proper construction of these provisions as they affect an impecunious defendant obliged to bear the
costs of his prosecution is possible only through a thorough examination of the history of related statutes which, in times past, permitted
incarceration in cases of involuntary default in payment. Only
through an analysis of all statutes relating to costs assessments and incarceration can it be determined whether Illinois law, in fact, sanctions penal confinement of a convicted person to compel enforcement
of a judgment for costs.
Two distinct theories support the conclusion that a judgment requiring the convicted offender to reimburse the state for costs incurred in
his prosecution cannot be executed by imprisonment of the offender
who involuntarily 3 defaults in payment of the assessed costs. First,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973), supra note 19; see Wells v. McCullock,

51.

13 I11.606 (1852).

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973) states in pertinent part:
It shall be no objection to the selling of any property under such execution,

52.

that the body of the defendant is in custody for the fine or costs, or both [em-

phasis addedl.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-5 (1973) states in pertinent part:
[A]nd the defendant shall, upon the entering of such judgment, be discharged
from imprisonment on account of such fine or costs, but he shall not thereby

be discharged from any imprisonment which is made a part of his punishment
not dependent upon the payment of the fine or costs [emphasis added].
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (1973) states in pertinent Dart:
Whenever it shall . . . appear to the court . . . that any person who is confined in jail for any fine or costs of piosecutions . . . hath no estate where-

with to pay such fines and costs, or costs only, it shall be the duty of the said

court to discharge such person from further imprisonment for such fines and

costs, which discharge shall operate as a complete release of such fine and costs
* h . [emphasis added].
The complete text of these laws is set forth at notes 19 through 21 supra.
53. Voluntary default subjects the offender to civil contempt, and commitment is authorized until the offender complies with the order of the court as an exercise of the
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study of the history of prior statutes authorizing imprisonment in
cases of nonpayment of money obligations to the state, and of cases
interpreting these laws, reveals that Illinois law, despite contrary
language surviving in chapter 38, sections 180-4, 54 180-5,11 and
180-6,56 has never permitted incarceration of a defendant unable to
liquidate his liability solely for costs. Alternatively, enactment of the
Illinois Criminal Code of 196 157 and subsequent repeal of all statutes
authorizing imprisonment as a mode of enforcement of money obligations owed the state conclusively determines that no feasible construction of the costs assessment and enforcement provisions allows incarceration of persons financially incapable of satisfying a judgment for
costs.
Incarcerationto Enforce Payment of ObligationsOwed the
State: Development of the Statutes in Illinois
The practice of imprisoning offenders to enforce payment of
fines58 was an integral part of the common law. 59 Illinois law, prior
to 1973,60 authorized commitment of offenders sentenced to pay a fine
under chapter 38, section 1-7 (k)61 in the event of default. The offender was thereby permitted to "work off" his monetary obligation
to the state at the statutory rate of $5.00 per day. 2 Analysis of the
development of this law in terms of legislative intent indicates that
court's inherent power to punish as contemptuous acts which obstruct, impede or burden
orderly and impartial administration of the judicial process. People v. Gholson, 412 Ill.
294, 106 N.E.2d 333 (1952). The court distinguishes criminal from civil contempt as
follows:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. A civil contempt ordinarily
consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil
action for the benefit of the opposing party therein.
412 Ill. at 298, 106 N.E.2d at 336. This distinction is crucial; prosecution for criminal
contempt affords the defendant the right to trial by jury as in other criminal prosecutions. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
The sentence of imprisonment for civil contempt is imposed as a remedial or coercive
measure; the contumacious party is incarcerated until he complies with the mandate of
the court, since imposition of a fine or imprisonment for a specified term might not secure obedience to the court's order. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736
(1949).
54. See note 52 supra.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1973).
58. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
59. Brown v. People, 19 Ill. 612 (1858); Kanter v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 108
Ill.
App. 287 (1903).
60. For discussion of the legislative repeal of this authority, see text accompanying
notes 97 through 105 infra.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(k) (1971) (repealed 1973). The statute is set
forth in its entirety in the text accompanying note 95 infra.
62. Id.
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the authority to incarcerate an offender for nonpayment of monetary obligations to the state arises only in cases in which a sentence of
a fine is inflicted; judgment for costs, absent a sentence of a fine, resulted in no further imprisonment of the defendant beyond the term
imposed as punishment for his crime.
The Illinois costs assessment provisions 3 have remained virtually
unchanged since 1833.4 The early statutes included, however, a
further provision, no longer part of Illinois law, 65 which codified the
established common law principle6 of compelling payment of fines
through commitment upon default. This statute provided:
The court shall have power in all cases of conviction under this
act, when any fine is implicated, to order, as part of the judgment of the court, that the offender shall be committed to jail,
there to remain until the
fines and costs are fully paid, or other67
wise legally discharged.
This law may not be construed as a means of alternative sentencing,
for the assessment of the fine defined the extent of punishment inflicted.6 8 Commitment was authorized only as incident to and for purposes of enforcement of the sentence that the offender pay a fine, so
that subsequent imprisonment occurred only in cases of default of
payment of the fine.6 9
Judgment that the defendant pay a fine is clearly distinct from taxation of costs in that the latter arises incidentally, as a matter of
course from the judgment of conviction. The fine is the sentence;
judgment that the offender pay the cost of his prosecution is a part of
the judgment of conviction, and not a part of the sentence. 0 A fair
construction of this enabling provision is that it empowered the court
only to enforce sentences of fines by incarceration; upon the accomplishment of such commitment the offender was detained in prison un63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 180-3, 180-4, 180-5, 180-6 (1973). For purposes of
clarity, these laws are hereinafter referred to as the costs assessment provisions.
64. See ILL. STAT. 1833 p. 214-16, §§ 181-84.
65. For discussion of the limitation and subsequent repeal of this law see text accompanying notes 83 through 91 infra.
66. Kanter v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 108 Ill. App. 287 (1903).
67. ILL. STAT. 1833 p. 209, § 163. For purposes of clarity, this law, in the various
forms in which it existed until its repeal, is hereinafter referred to as the enabling provision.
68. Ex parte Bollig, 31 Ill. 88 (1863); Kanter v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 108
Ill. App. 287 (1903).
69. In Kanter v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 108 Ill. App. 287, 304 (1903), the court
stated:
That where a fine is imposed, it is the punishment ordered, and the commitment is but an incident, is an established doctrine of the common law.
70. For further discussion of the basis of this distinction, see text accompanying
notes 3 through 33 supra.
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til his entire monetary obligation to the state, 7 ' fines and costs, was
expunged. By its terms,'7 this law did not extend to initial commitment of the defendant upon default in the payment of costs alone
and did not authorize continued imprisonment past the term meted
out to him upon his conviction for recovery of costs alone.73

The court's power to incarcerate convicted persons who failed to
satisfy fines until all moneys due the state were paid under the Illinois
enabling provisions was subsequently modified by the introduction
of two laws relating to recovery of funds owed to the state. In
1879, the legislature enacted,7 4 as part of the larceny statute,7 5 a
provision enabling courts to require offenders convicted of petit larceny
or of any misdemeanor in which a fine could be levied as part of the
penalty, to work76 out the fine and attendant costs for the public

benefit at a statutory rate of credit of $1.50 per day. 77 This provision amplified prior law which had authorized imprisonment in the
penitentiary upon conviction of grand larceny for a term of 1 to 10

years, and imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum period of
1 year plus a maximum fine of $100 upon conviction of petit larceny, 8
by providing an effective means of compelling payment of the fine
71. The constitutional prohibitions against incarceration of debtors was circumvented
by the Illinois courts' construction of the prohibition as applicable only to debts arising
ex contractu. Kennedy v. People, 122 II1. 649, 13 N.E. 213 (1887).

72.

Compare the terms of

LA. CODE CRIM.

P. art. 884 (1973):

If a sentence imposed includes a fine or costs, the sentence shall provide that
in default of payment thereof the defendant shall be imprisoned for a specified
period not to exceed one year; p-ovided that where the maximum prison sentence wh'ch may be imposed as a penalty for a misdemeanor is six months
or less, the total period of imprisonment upon conviction of the offense, including imprisonment for default in payment of a fine or costs, shall not exceed
six months for that offense [emphasis added].
Clearly. the terms of this law contemplate that costs may be imposed as part of the penalty inflicted upon the offender; default in payment of costs under this language, compels
incarceration. The terms of the Illinois enabling provision, which authorized incarceration only in cases of default in the payment of a line, are in marked contrast.
73. Relief to the indigent defendant, who defaulted in payment of his fine was afforded upon a satisfactory demonstration by the defendant to the court that he was without funds, under ILL. STAT. 1845 p. 187, § 195, a provision virtually identical to ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (1973), supra note 21. Exparte Bollg, 31 111. 88 (1863).
74. Il. Laws 1879 p. 117 (repealed 1962).
75. I1. Laws 1879 p. 118 (repealed 1962).
76. For purposes of clarity, this statute is hereinafter referred to as the working out
provision.
77. Il. Laws 1879 p. 118 (repealed 1962). The statute provided:
That any person convicted of petit larceny, or any misdemeanor punishable
under the laws of this State. in whole, or in part, by fine may be required by
the order of the Courts of Record, in which the conviction is had, to work out
such fine and all costs, in the work-house of the city. town or county, or in
the streets and alleys; of any city or town, or on the public roads in the county,
under the proper person in charge of such work-house, streets, alleys. or public
roads, at the rate of one dollar and fifty one hundreth dollars ($1.50) per day
for each day's work.
78. Ill. Laws 1877 p. 85 (repealed 1879).
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imposed upon conviction of petit larceny or other misdemeanor.
The effect of this working out provision upon the already established enabling provision, as clearly explained in Berkenfield v. People 9 was to vest an option in the court upon conviction of the defend-

ant of an offense for which both a fine and imprisonment could be
imposed. Under the enabling provision, the court was empowered to
order incarceration of the offender for a specified term; if the fine was
not satisfied upon completion of that term, the offender was simply
further detained until such fine, along with costs, were paid.80 Extension of the sentence of imprisonment in this case directly corresponded with default in the sentence to pay the fine, not with failure
to pay costs. Under the working out provisions, the court was empowered to commit the defendant to labor, at the statutory rate of
credit, upon expiration of his period of incarceration until his fines
and costs were satisfied.81 This sanction also was primarily intended
to compel satisfaction of fines which were not collectible by execution.8 2
Extension of the term of incarceration under both laws due to default in payment of costs was wholly incidental to the initial authorization to detain the defendant past his completion of his sentence of
imprisonment, and such authorization was clearly limited to cases of
failure to satisfactorily defray the fine imposed.
The second legislative enactment affecting the imposition of penal
sanctions to compel recovery of moneys due the state was section 2
of the Parole and Pardon Act, effective in 1917, providing that:
79. 191 111.
272, 61 N.E. 96 (1901).
80. Id. at 277, 61 N.E. at 98:
Under an indictment charging a single offense upon a conviction for which
both fine and imprisonment may be imposed, the court may properly order the
defendant, for a failure to vay such fine and costs, to be impr soned, such imprisonment to commence after the expiration of the term fixed as a punishment
for the crime, otherwise the sentence of imprisonment and fine would be satisfied by imprisonment only.
81. Id. at 278, 61 N.E. at 99:
[T]he court had power to commit the defendant to the county jail after expiration of the time for which he was specifically sentenced, there to remain until
such fine and the costs of this proceeding were paid, and that in default thereof
he be required to work out such fine and costs in a workhouse, or upon the
streets, alleys and public roads of the city, town or county wheren said conviction was had, at the rate of $1.50 per day, unless he be otherwise discharged
pursuant to law.
82. Berkenfield v. People, 191 Ill.
272, 61 N.E. 96 (1901); People v. Shattuck, 274
Ill. 491, 113 N.E. 921 (1916); People ex rel. Hoyne v. Windes, 283 Ill.
251, 119 N.E.
279 (1918); People v. Jaraslowski. 254 Il1. 299, 98 N.E. 574 (1912).
These latter two
cases mark one further effect of the working out provision: the indigent sentenced to
work out his fine was precluded f-om seeking relief under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 455
(1911), a provision virtually identical to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (1973), supra
note 21. See note 73 supra. An indigent was entitled to discha-ge fom full satisfaction
of his fine and costs under the working out provisions only if he were physically incapable of labor. People v. Hedenberg, 21 111. App. 2d 504, 158 N.E.2d 417 (1959).
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No person shall by any court be committed to the penitentiary,
reformatory
or other State institution for recovery of a fine or
8
costs.

8

This statute effectively prevented a defendant's sentence of imprisonment to state penal institutions being extended by compelling him to
submit to further imprisonment for an indefinite period upon failure
to satisfy his financial obligations to the state,8 4 removing the option
present under the enabling provision. 6
Thus, judicial power to incarcerate an offender upon failure to satisfy a monetary obligation to the state functioned only in cases where
the defendant's default was in paying a fine inflicted as either whole or
partial punishment for his offense, warranting an order that he work
off amounts owed the state. No Illinois statute ever sanctioned either
initial imprisonment or extension of a term of imprisonment due to the
offender's failure to pay costs alone. Therefore, the language of the
costs assessment provisions which make reference to incarceration of
the defendant upon his default in payment8 6 must be read as
referring to the only cases where such incarceration was statutorily
permitted, i.e., where failure to pay a fine subjected the defaulter to
commitment to satisfy his obligations to the state.
This construction of the interrelationships of the Illinois costs assessments provisions and the incarceration provisions8 7 is buttressed by
the fact that Illinois cases discuss the issue of costs in one of only two
contexts: issuance of the order assessing costs88 and resolution of the
83.

I11. Laws 1917 p. 353.

This provision has survived, in various forms,

since its enactment, and exists today as part of the New Code of Corrections, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-6(d) (1973).
84. People v. Stavrakas, 335 Ill. 570, 167 N.E. 852 (1929); People v. Tidrick, 269
Ill. App. 191, 180 N.E. 796 (1933).

85. Although thus severely circumscribed in operation, all vestiges of the enabling
provision were not expunged from Illinois law until 1973. For further discussion, see

text accompanying notes 97 through 105 infra.
86. See note 52 supra.
87. See notes 67 and 76 supra.
88. See, e.g., Carpenter v. People, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 147 (1846) (defendant whose
conviction was reversed by the state supreme court was still liable for the costs of his
appeal); Wells v. McCullock, 13 Ill. 606 (1852) (acquittal or other legal discharge of
a party indicted under the criminal code absolved him from the payment of all costs);
Moody v. People, 20 Ill. 315 (1858) (defendant tried jointly with others is liable only

for his own costs upon conviction); Borschenious v. People, 41 Ill. 236 (1866) (defendant is liable for costs of each count in the indictment under which he is convicted);
Corbin v. People, 52 Ill. App. 355 (1893) (defendant is liable for fees of witnesses who
are residents of foreign counties); People v. Harris, 97 Ill. App. 2d 288, 240 N.E.2d
123, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 985 (1968) (trial court properly assessed costs against defendant even though counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal under ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, § 607 (1973); People v. Taylor, 401 Ill. 11, 81 N.E.2d 463 (1948)

(order of the trial court committing defendant to the penitentiary until his costs were
paid was void under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 802 (1947), a provision virtually identical
to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-6(d) (1973); see text accompanying note 83 supra.
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validity of the practice of holding the offender obliged to satisfy attendant costs once he had already been incarcerated for failure to pay a
fine. 9 No Illinois case reports either initial commitment or detention
of the defendant past the term of imprisonment meted out to him
upon his conviction for failure to discharge his liability for costs.
The Effect of the New Illinois CriminalCode and
the 1970 Constitution
Although the offender did not suffer imprisonment for default in
payment of costs alone, this proved slight comfort to the defendant
already sentenced to labor for failure to pay his fine whose term was
extended while he worked off all sums of money due the state, fines
and costs, at the statutory rate.9 0 This practice of recovery of costs in
labor from a defendant already incarcerated for nonpayment of his
fine was legislatively abrogated by the advent of the new Criminal
Code in 1961.a1 The Code repealed prior enabling9 2 and working
off 9 3 provisions;9 4 all surviving portions of these laws were incorporated
into chapter 38, section 1-7(k) of the Code, which provided:
A judgment of a fine imposed upon an offender may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment entered in a civil action; provided, however, that in such judgment imposing the fine
the court may further order that upon nonpayment of such fine,
89. See, e.g., Lambert v. People, 43 Il. App. 223 (1892) (defendant is estopped from
contesting the accuracy of the assessment of his fine or costs where he had forestalled
his incarceration for default in payment of his fine and obtained a release from monetary obligations by entering a confession of judgment for the amounts owed); People
v. Stavrakas, 335 Ill. 570, 167 N.E. 852 (1929) (defendant who defaulted in payment
of his fine could not be imprisoned in the penitentiary, but could be sentenced to work
off the amounts owed the state at the statutory rate); People v. Tidrick, 269 Ill. App.
191, 180 N.E. 796 (1933) (order committing defendant to the penitentiary upon default
in the payment of her fine was void under section 2 of the Parole and Pardon Act; see
text accompanying note 83 supra); People v. Hedenberg, 21 Ill. App. 2d 504, 158 N.E.2d
417 (1959) (defendant committed to jail to work out his fine was not entitled to release
on a pauper petition, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 766 (1957), see note 21 supra, unless
he was physically unable to work); Berkenfield v. People, 191 Il. 272, 61 N.E. 96
(1901) (defendant sentenced to work out his fine was not entitled to discharge where
the judgment did not actually require him to labor, since such omission was in the defendant's favor); People v. Shattuck, 274 Ill. 491, 113 N.E. 921 (1916) (court lost jurisdiction of the defendant where the court delayed 6 years before issuing an order of commitment to enforce payment of a fine).
90. The working out provision was subsequently amended to raise the rate of credit
to $5.00 per day. Ill. Laws 1959 p. 2271 (repealed 1962).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1973).
92. Ill. Laws 1959 p. 593 (repealed 1964).
93. Ill. Laws 1959 p. 2271 (repealed 1962).
94. The provisions prohibiting commitment of any person to a state institution for
recovery of fine or costs was also repealed. Ill. Laws 1961 p. 2271 (repealed 1964). It
was incorporated in virtually identical form in the new Criminal Code, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 119-2(d) (1965). Currently, it is part of the new Code of Corrections, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-6(d) (1973).
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the offender may be imprisoned until the fine is paid, or satisfied
at the rate of $5.00 per day of imprisonment; provided, further,
however, that no person shall be imprisoned under the first pro-

viso hereof for a longer period than 6 months. 95
Legislative extraction of all reference to costs from this law conclusively demonstrates that incarceration occurred thereafter only in cases
of default in the payment. Legislative rationale for the exclusion
of costs from this penal provision becomes clear upon examination
of the distinct underlying considerations served by fines and costs.
Fines are punitive, and constitute part of the sentence inflicted; their
enforcement is directly within the state's penal interest. Costs are
compensatory. Converting an assessment for costs into a prison
term to recover moneys expended by the state in trying the offender
is illogical, for prisoners compound, rather than defray, state expense. 6
Ratification of the new Illinois Constitution 7 tolled the death knell
for the practice of incarcerating persons who defaulted in payment
of fines by supplementing prior prohibitions against imprisonment
for debt with an express ban on commitment of any person, except
in cases of willful default, for failure to satisfy a criminal fine, unless
sufficient time is afforded for payment, by installment, if necessary. 98
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(k) (1963) (repealed 1973) (emphasis added).
This statute was adjudged unconstitutional on equal piotection grounds in its effect on
indigent defendants unable to pay fines levied as part of their penalty in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). The defendant in that case received the statutory maximum
sentence of one year's imprisonment and a fine of $500 plus $5 court costs upon conviction of theft, and the trial judge directed that if the defendant was in default at the expiration of his imprisonment term he would remain committed to work off his monetary
obligations to the state, as provided in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(k) (1969) (repealed
1973). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the order. People v. Williams, 41 111. 2d
511 244 N.E.2d 197 (19nai).

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that although incarceration to enforce payment of fires was not in itself constitutionallv invalid, imprisonment beyond
the maximum term fixed by the statute governing the offense involved, due to involuntary norpayment of fines or costs, constituted an impermissible discrimination which violated the equal orotection clause.
Although the issue of inclusion of costs in the order was not specifically raised, probably due to the relatively slight sum involved, it is submitted that the trial court's order
requiring extended commitment in the event of default to sat'sfy both fines and costs
was patently v'olative of the clear terms of § 1-7(k). In affirming the order, the Illinois
Supreme Ccurt reiterated the permissibility of extending imprisonment only in terms of
saiisfact'on of the fine. 41 111.2d at 514, 515. 516, 517, 244 N.E.2d at 198, 199, 200.
96. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, (1971); Charging Costs of Prosecution, supra note
10.
97. ILL. CONST. (1970).
98. Art. 1. § 14 of the Illinois Coistitution of 1970 p-ovides:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt unless he refuses to deliver up his estate
for the benefit of his creditors as provided by law or unless there is a strong
presumpt'on of fraud. No person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay a fine
in a crmb'al cpse u-less he has been afforded adequate time to make payment,
in installments if necessary, and has willfully failed to make payment.
The first sentence of art. 1, § 14 is virtually identical to art. 2, § 12 of the Illinois Con-
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The fatal blow was struck by the repeal99 of chapter 38, section
1-7(k) and the concomitant enactment of chapter 38, section 10059-1 et seq., 100 governing fines, as part of the new Code of Corrections.' 0 ' These provisions enable the court to revoke the fine, or
10 2
any unpaid portion thereof, or to modify the method of payment,
which may be either on an installment basis or within a period of time
specified by the court.'
Default is now a matter of civil contempt,
subjecting the offender to imprisonment, unless he demonstrates that
his failure to pay the fine was not due to a lack of good faith effort.' 0 '
If the default is not intentional, the court may allow additional time
for payment, reduce the amount of the fine or of each installment,
or revoke the fine or the unpaid portion.0 5 Thus, imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines occurs only in narrow cases of willful default.
No similar provisions qualifying the language referring to incarceration in the costs assessment provisions'
have been enacted. Although this may be explained as legislative oversight, an equally
plausible view is that since Illinois law has traditionally sanctioned
initial imprisonment only for failure to satisfy a fine, a default
in costs payment being only incidental, abrogation of laws authorizing commitment upon default in fines payment precluded a fortiori
commitment for failure to pay costs. A system of laws analogous to
chapter 38, section 1005-9-1 et seq. relating to costs is wholly unnecessary.
Further, examination of Illinois law has demonstrated that chapter 38, section 1-7(k) was the sole remaining statute authorizing
incarceration for default in payment of money obligations. " 7 Even
if chapter 38, section 1-7(k) and its predecessors could be construed as allowing either initial imprisonment or extension of a fixed
term of imprisonment, clearly, repeal of the sole enabling statute
terminates that authority. Again, the differences in rationale underlying fines and costs supports this contention: since fines, in constitution of 1870, which provided:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, unless upon refusal to deliver up his
estate for the benefit of his creditors, in such a manner as shall be prescribed
by law, or in cases where there is strong presumption of fraud.
99.

Public Act 77-2097, effective January 1, 1973.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-9-1 etseq. (1973).
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1001 etseq. (1973).
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-9-2 (1973).

100. ILL.
101. ILL.
102. ILL.
103. ILL.
104. ILL.

REV. STAT.
REV. STAT.

ch. 38, § 1005-9-1 (1973).
ch. 38, § 1005-9-3 (1973).

105. Id.
106. See note 52 supra.
107. Cf. People v. Williams, 41 111. 2d 511, 244 N.E.2d 197 (1970); People v. Allen,
307 I11.App. 241, 30 N.E.2d 116 (1940) (abstract opinion).
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trast to costs, are clearly punitive, a dilution of the authority to imprison for nonpayment of fines must extend to costs as well.1" 8
The current effect of the incarceration language in the costs assessment provisions may be gauged by an examination of the operation
of these provisions. A lien attaches to the accused's property at the
time of the finding of indictment. 10 9 Costs are assessed upon a
judgment of conviction." 0 If the defendant is financially unable to
pay the costs, no statute exists which enables the court to incarcerate
him, so a demonstration by the defendant that his nonpayment is
involuntary"' must gain him respite from costs payment. 1 2 The judgment for costs remains in full force and effect, collectible by execution" I in the event that the defendant fortuitously sheds his indigent
4
status.11
Clearly, the language referring to imprisonment of a defendant
who defaults in payment of costs in the costs assessment provisions" 5
is mere surplusage. This language presumes that incarceration for
default in the payment of money obligations has already been accomplished. Since no provision sanctions such incarceration, this
language can have no effect.
EQUAL PROTECTION

The Illinois costs assessment provisions are mandatory'" in operation and applicable, theoretically, in every criminal case where conviction is rendered. However, even a law nondiscriminatory on its face
may function to arbitrarily or capriciously burden certain groups; 1 ,
where no rational basis 8 for isolating these classes is demonstrated,
108. ChargingCosts of Prosecution, supra note 10, at 996.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973). The text of this law is set forth at
note 19 supra.

110. ILL.

REv. STAT.

ch. 38, § 180-3 (1973).

This statute is set forth in the text

accompanying note 13 supra.
111. The court retains inherent contempt power to discipline a wilfull defaulter.
Kennedy v. People, 12.2 II!. 649, 13 N.E. 213 (1887). For further discussion, see note
53 supra.

112.

People v. Davis, 2 Il.App. 3d 106, 276 N.E.2d 134 (1971).

But see discussion

in text accompanying notes 185 through 186 infra.

113.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973).

The text of this statute is set forth

at note 19 supra.

114. People v. Davis, 2 Ill. App. 3d 106, 108, 276 N.E.2d 134, 136 (1971).
115. For discussion of consequences of voluntary default, see the reference to the
contempt power of the court, note 53 supra.
116.

See discussion at note 41 supra.

117.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

118. Traditionally, the equal protection clause supports only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts; legislative groupings on the basis of imperfect and imprecise

generalizations is tolerated, so long as the classification bears a reasonable relationship
to the purpose for which it is structured, and affords equal treatment to all members
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the law is violative of equal protection. 119 Although superficially
neutral in operation, these costs assessment laws in fact demark
distinct classifications and afford dissimilar treatment to the groups
differentiated. Inquiry into the operation of these statutes is two-fold:
whether de facto classifications resulting from operation of the stattues are arbitrarily drawn; and whether members of the groups so
classified are obliged to bear an undue encumbrance by application of the statutory provisions to them.
Convicted v. Acquitted Defendants
The costs asssessment provisions, by their terms, concern only convicted defendants. Thus, the statute selectively segregates two groups
from the large class of accuseds: those convicted and those acquitted of the charges against them. Analysis of these classifications
in equal protection terms necessitates further inquiry on two grounds.
(a) Should All Accuseds Be Obligated to Pay the Costs
of Their Prosecution?
Given the compensatory rationale of the costs assessment provisions, it might be argued that a defendant acquitted of all charges
should likewise be compelled to recompense the state for the amounts
of money, time and services expended in trying him. The fact of
whether or not a conviction is actually obtained is irrelevant for reimbursement purposes. The costs assessment statutes would then operate equally and consistently on all members of the large class of
accuseds, levying the 0 same fees whenever services were performed by
2
government officers.1
of the specified class. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
However, certain classifications, such as those based upon race or alienage, have been
declared inherently constitutionally suspect. These legislative groupings compel strict judicial scrutiny, and are validated only by a clear demonstration that a compelling governmental interest, rather than antagonism towards the group separated out, supports the
necessity for such classification. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).

This article discusses no classification which the United States Supreme Court has
termed suspect.
119.
120.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Pennsylvania law, under the Act of 1860, 19 PA. STAT. § 1222 (1963), had long

sanctioned the practice of rendering a judgment for costs incurred in criminal proceedings against acquitted defendants as reimbursement to the county for its expenditures

whenever the jury determined that the accused, rather than the county or the prosecutor,
was the proper party to bear such expenses. Pennsylvania courts upheld the practice

for over 100 years, reasoning that:
However anomalous the course may appear to jurisdictions unfamiliar with our
procedure, it is the law of this commonwealth, and it works substantial justice.
Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 415 Pa. 139, 141 n.2, 202 A.2d 55, 57 (1964).

The Giaccio
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This argument, however, flagrantly ignores the basic theory supporting the compensatory rationale for the assessment of costs in criminal
proceedings: that the offender, the person whose conduct provided
the impetus for mobilization of the criminal justice system, is the
proper party to bear the attendant costs.12 1 The burden of proving
such conduct beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the state. The
accused is haled into court, much against his own volition; 2' certainly he cannot be found to have occasioned the prosecutorial proceedings by his conduct when his accusers fail to sustain their burden of demonstrating that such conduct in fact occurred. Failure to
successfully discharge this burden requires the conclusion that the acquitted accused is not the proper party to bear the costs of the criminal proceedings; a contrary result is wholly repugnant to basic notions of procedural due process, since the obligation to reimburse arises
only upon a judgment of conviction.
(b) Should Acquitted Defendants Be Granted a Right of Costs
Recovery Against the State?
Although an accused acquitted of all charges against him is spared
criminal penalization and the concomitant stigma of conviction, he
sustains manifest loss through his involuntary participation in the
criminal justice system. It is the universal rule in the United States
that the accused bears the cost of his defense, regardless of the subsequent determination of his guilt or innocence.'12 3 In addition, the
opinion is extensively analyzed in Comment, Man Acquitted of Misdemeanor Obligated
to Pay Costs or Be Incarcerated,60 Nw. U.L. REv. 251 (1965).
The Act of 1860 was declared void for vagueness in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399 (1966), by the United States Supreme Court, seven members holding that it lacked
adequate legal, enforceable standards by which to determine when an accused would be
saddled with the costs of an unsuccessful prosecution. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court's act of terming the assessment compensatory, rather than punitive, could not cure
this facial defect, for:

Whatever label be given the 1860 Act, there is no doubt that it provides the
State with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant of his liberty and
his property. Both liberty and property are specifically protected by the Four-

teenth Amendment against any state deprivation which does not meet the
standards of due process, and this protection is not to be avoided bv the simple

label a State chooses to fasten upon its conduct or its statute. So here this
State Act whether labeled "penal" or not must meet the challenge that it is
unconstitutionally vague.

382 U.S. at 402. Justices Stewart and Fortas concurred on fourteenth amendment
grounds, but relied on the due process clause to support their view that constitutional
offensiveness was inherent in the imposition of any penalty upon a defendant found not
guilty of the offense with which he was charged.
121. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 22 through 26 supra.

122.

Arnold v. State, 76 Wy. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957); Saunders v. People, 63 Colo.

241. 165 P. 781 (1917).
123. Note, The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs and a Reasonable Attorney Fee
to the Non-Indigent Defendant Upon Acquittal, 49 NEB. L. REv. 515, 516 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs].
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accused may be subjected to the costs of making bond and loss of
wages during trial, as well as the humiliation of
and the frustration, apprehension and stigma
against a criminal prosecution, irrespective of its
The acquitted person is left in the midst of this

arrest and detention
innate in defending
ultimate outcome. 24
plight with only the

wholly inadequate remedy of a possibility of an action in tort for ma-

licious prosecution.12 5 Certainly these factors denote the need for
providing at least a partial remedy to the accused person upon his acquittal in the form of recoupment of his costs in successfully defending
1 26
against the state.
Cases discussing this question posit two rationalizations for disal-

lowances of costs to the acquitted person. First, since statutes governing costs must be strictly construed, only those costs specifically
detailed in the statutes are allowed. 1 27 The laws of no jurisdiction provide for recovery of costs from the state, so all claims are ignored.
Clearly, this reasoning is less than intellectually satisfying, for the legislature could implement any societal demand for costs allowance
12
by simply statutorily so providing. Second, sovereign immunity
124. Id.
125. The inadequacy of this remedy is inherent in its limited application. The plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution sustains the burden of proving that the criminal proceeding was commenced without probable cause, regardless of whether or not the
action of the prosecutor stemmed from malice. Further, prosecuting attorneys themselves, when they merely conduct proceedings on complaints sworn out by others are
held to be acting as quasi-judicial officers. In these circumstances, an absolute privilege
cloaks prosecutorial actions: no liability is possible even if the prosecuting attorney acts
in bad faith and without probable cause, or overzealously prosecutes his case. The same
immunity is generally extended to the police and other law enforcement officers who
act within the scope of their duties.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToPTS § 119 (4th ed. 1971)

[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See generally The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs,
supra note 123.
126. Those who advocate the passage of laws allowing reimbursement to acquitted
persons articulate policy considerations analogous to those supporting damages awards
generally: that innocent men must be made whole with regard to debts incurred during
their defense in criminal proceedings. The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs, supra
note 123, at 517.
127. People v. Pierce, 6 II. (1 Gilm.) 553 (1844); Galpin v. City of Chicago, 249
111. 554, 94 N.E. 961 (1911); People v. Summy, 377 II1. 255, 36 N.E.2d 331 (1941);
People v. Rocco, 4 Il1. App. 2d 238, 124 N.E.2d 25 (1955); People v. Dawson, 3 II.
App. 3d 668, 279 N.E.2d 483 (1972). The court in People v. Fox, 7 I11.App. 3d 707,
288 N.E.2d 500 (1972), articulated this notion as follows:
The common law does not authorize taxing or allowing costs in any case and
hence in this State judgments for costs must rest upon statutes. The courts
cannot merely by inference and implication assume the power and exercise the
authority to impose costs against the State.
7 Ill. App. 3d at 708. 279 N.E.2d at 501.
128. The concept of sovereign immunity was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). Justice Holmes enunciated the principle as follows:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or absolute theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). Further, U.S. CON T. Amend.
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protects the state, absent its consent, from suit by one of its citizens.
However, in view of the modern trend towards abrogation of absoute immunities, 12 9 blanket governmental consent to reimburse ac-

quitted persons for expenditures incurred in defending in criminal proceedings could be legislatively decreed.
Notwithstanding these two grounds for disallowance of costs to per-

sons discharged upon a verdict of not guilty, a third, unexpressed
rationale is apparent: awarding costs to all persons acquitted is
simply undersirable social policy. 1 0 A legislative determination that
obliging convicted persons to recompense the state, while withholding

from acquitted persons the commensurate right to compensation from
the state, has been found rational by the United States Supreme Court
in recognition that such inequities are an inherent and unavoidable

part of our legal system.'
Criminal v. Civil Execution of the Judgment Lien
Under the execution statute" 2 of the Illinois costs assessment
XI provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any Suit, in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State [emphasis added].
129. See generally PROSSER, supra note 125, § 131, 133. See also Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Iln. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968
(1959) (abrogation of municipal immunity); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1965) (abrogation of charitable immunity).
130. See generally Charging Costs of Prosecution, supra note 10. This determination is a corollary of the demanding burden remaining in the prosecution to sustain its
proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Double jeopardy generally
precludes prosecutorial right to appeal from acquittal at the trial level. See PRESIDENT's
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CoURTs 47-48 (1967).
Also, the exclusion of highly probative evidence is
often required in order to vindicate the accused's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Consequently, some commentators have concluded that a verdict of not guilty is unavailing for purposes of distinguishing between "legally" and "factually" guilty defendants. Since no unequivocal distinction is possible between "innocent" and "factually
guilty" defendants on the basis of acquittal, the argument runs, awarding costs to all
acquitted persons is wholly inadvisable. See generally Brief for the People of the State
of Illinois as Amicus Curiae, People v. Schwanz, Indictment No. 74-2625, filed January,
1975, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
131. In Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1974), the United States Supreme
Court stated:
We conclude that this classification is wholly noninvidious ....
The imposition of such dislocations and hardships without an ultimate conviction is, of
course, unavoidable in a legal system that requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and guarantees important procedural protections to every defendant in a criminal trial . . . . This legislative decision reflects no more than
an effort to achieve elemental fairness and is a far cry from the kind of invidious discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause condemns.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973). The text of this statute is set forth
at note 19 supra.
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provisions, a lien attaches to property of the accused which is
otherwise exempt at the time of indictment. The statute fixes
expiration period for the lien. Since criminal execution, when
quired, is effected by statute in the same manner as in civil cases,
focus of inquiry narrows to two questions.

not
no
rethe

(a) Is the Relation Back of the Lien to the Time of Indictment
an Arbitrary Discrimination?
A judgment did not create a lien upon the real or personal property
of the debtor at common law; rather, the judgment lien is purely
a statutory creature.13
Since a lien arises only upon judgment in
civil cases,' 8 4 the relation back of the lien to the time of indictment
under chapter 38, section 180-4 creates a marked variance in treatment of civil debtors and convicted offenders. This distinction is not
irrational, however, in view of the pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court that the state's claim to reimbursement may
take precedence over the claims of private creditors, so that procedures implementing the respective interests need not be identical. 1" 5
The offender becomes liable for payment of costs only upon a judgment of conviction, and execution is stayed until 30 days after default. Therefore, the relation back of the lien to the time of indictment works no manifest hardship and is not arbitrary in that this
procedure serves legitimate state concerns by precluding fraudulent
concealment of assets in the interim between indictment and judgment.
(b) Does the Creationof a Lien Which Does Not Expire
By Its Terms Cause Undue Hardship?
Judgment liens arising in civil cases expire after a 7-year term.'
By contrast, chapter 38, section 180-4 fixes no termination period
for the judgment lien created upon indictment. However, this variation cannot be analyzed in equal protection terms because Illinois
courts have not yet determined whether the provision in chapter 38,
133.
134.

Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E.2d 478 (1938).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (1973).

135. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Although recognizing the validity of
state interests served by recoupment provisions, the Supreme Court found the particular

statute at issue violative of equal protection in that it failed to allow criminal defendants
all the exemptions provided for other judgment debtors. The Illinois statute, by contrast,
which allows identical exemptions to those provided civil judgment debtors and operates

in precisely the same manner as in civil cases, suffers from no such constitutional infirmities.
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (1973).
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section 180-4 for enforcement of judgments "in the same manner as in
civil cases" includes the element of time within which the state must
act in order to preserve its privilege of execution. 1'5 It is submitted
that interminably extending a judgment lien imposes an unduly harsh
burden upon the convicted person and his family, whose assets are
thereby unceasingly subject to execution and levy. Construction
of chapter 38, section 180-4, which limits the duration of the judgment lien to the 7-year period recognized in civil cases and commences the 7-year term from the time of the creation of the lien, would
not defeat the legitimate interests of the state in recouping expenditures and would eliminate discriminatory effects of the statute by
guaranteeing a respite to the convicted person financially incapable
of satisying a judgment for costs within the statutory period.
Affluent v. Indigent Defendants
Written laws are like spiders' webs, and will like them only entangle and hold the poor and weak, while the rich and powerful
38
will easily break through them.'

Judicial recognition that neutral laws may function to arbitrarily
deny the indigent the ability to assert rights which are not ordinarily
jeopardized where money is available to purchase vindication of those
rights is especially patent in the area of costs assessment. The thrust
of every pertinent decision of the United States Supreme Court
since Griffin v. Illinois'3" is that inability to advance costs cannot op137. A discussion of this question published 24 years ago noted that, although the
Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E.2d 478
(1938), declared that statutory provisions defining the time within which the right must
be exercised constitute not a statute of limitations, which would not bind the sovereign,
but are instead an integral part of the grant of such right, it was unclear whether the
criminal execution provisions at issue here were governed by that case. The determination was dependent upon whether the term "manner" as used in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 180-4 was intended to include the element of time. Kratovil & Harrison, Enforcement of Judgments Against Real Property, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 14-16. The passage of time has injected no further clarity into the interpretation of this term in the
context of criminal executions.
138. ANACHARSIS: To Solon, noted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 561 (compiled
by G. Seldes) (1972).
139. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Supreme Court held that, upon establishing an appellate process for review of criminal convictions, a state could not preclude access to that
process solely on the basis of the defendant's financial inability to purchase a transcript.
The aggregate effect of subsequent application of this principle is that the indigent defendant may not be foreclosed from utilization of any direct or collateral remedy to
which the affluent defendant has ready access. See, e.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959) (state may not require an indigent criminal defendant to pay a filing fee as a
prerequisite to filing a motion for leave to appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961) (state may not require payment of a statutory filing fee before permitting an
indigent defendant to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963) (state practice which authorized the trial court to determine the
frivolity of the defendant's assignments of error and deny preparation of a free transcript
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erate to preclude a defendant from access to any stage of the criminal process.

The effect of the Illinois costs assessment provisions must

therefore be thoroughly scrutinized to ascertain that, in compliance
with the constitutional mandate, enforcement of these provisions does

not function to impede the indigent's access to the criminal process.
(a) Who Is an Indigent?
This threshold inquiry is troublesome because, although commentary on the topic abounds, 40 judicial definitions of the term have
been neither consistent nor frequent,'
and discuss the state of indigency solely in the context of ability to secure adequate representation.1 42 The problem seems to defy resolution: even if standards
for criteria to be considered in the determination of indigency may be
satisfactorily articulated,' 4 3 the prospect of judicial administration of
on that basis, thereby precluding appellate review, was unconstitutional); Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 477 (1963) (state procedure under which an indigent was foreclosed from appealing the denial of coram nobis because of the public defender's belief that such appeal
would be unsuccessful was unconstitutional).
140. See generally REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY

7-8, 40-41 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE]; D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 84, 150-51,

176-77 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM]; Prettyman, Three Modern Problems in Criminal
Law, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law]; Stifler, Determining the Financial Status of an Accused, 54 ILL.
B.J. 868 (19,66) [hereinafter cited as Financial Status of an Accused]; Comment, The
Definition of Indigency: A Modern-Day Legal Jabberwocky, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 34
(1972).
141. One commentator suggests four basic problems in formulating an operative definition of indigency: (1) reviewing courts have posited only hazy and inconsistent definitions of indigency; (2) standards for determining indigency are not spelled out in the
statutes, but rather relegated to the exercise of judicial discretion; (3) practices for determining indigency vary widely even within counties in a single state; (4) critics are
in disagreement as to whether primary responsibility for defining indigency rests with
the courts, prosecutors or the organized bar. FinancialStatus of an Accused, supra note
140, at 870.
142. State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676, 521 P.2d 706 (1974); State
v. Vallejos, 87 Ariz. 119, 348 P.2d 554 (1960); People v. Eggers, 27 Ill. 2d 85, 188
N.E.2d 30 (1963). See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRImINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (Approved Draft
1968) 53-59 [hereinafter cited as PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES]; Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REV.
579 (1963); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for the Indigent Criminal Defendant, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (1964); Note, Eligibility for Appointed Counsel in
Criminal Cases: Proposed Standards and Determination Procedures, 18 DE PAUL L.
REV. 243 (1968); Dowling & Yantis, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in Illinois, 47 Cm. B. RECORD 216 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Defense of the Poor in Illinois].
143. Judge Prettyman expresses the problem of determining the finite bounds of indigent status as follows:
Of course a person with nothing in any way, shape or form is indigent. But
suppose that, although he has no ready cash, he has a good job. Or suppose
that he has assets such as a car, a television set or a refrigerator. Suppose
he has a good job and some cash but has a wife and children. Suppose he
has no ready convertible asset but has an equity in a home. Suppose he has
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such standards in a criminal justice system characterized by insufficient numbers of courtrooms, judges and attorneys to combat increasingly overcrowded dockets is overwhelming.",
Certainly the determination of indigent status must remain fluid

in order to conform with the mandate of Griffin. The determination
must be subject to alteration throughout the various phases of criminal proceedings, and must be relative, measured by the particular
service or requirement under consideration and the comparative ability of the defendant to pay for it. 14 5 For purposes of this analysis,
the term "indigent" refers to a person who is financially incapable of
employing to his advantage the service under consideration, 4 6 or of
meeting pecuniary obligations imposed upon him.
Costs Are
(b) Is Equal ProtectionViolated When Assessed
147
Bond?
Bail
Indigent's
the
Deducted From
The Illinois bail statute

48

requires that pecuniary obligations aris-

in his pocket a hundred dollars but owns not another sou. Suppose he earns
plenty but spends more and so is always in debt. Suppose he has nothing himself, but has a wealthy father, a thrifty brother or a kindly employer or friend.
Suppose he can make no present payment but could make a satisfactory installment arrangement. Suppose he cannot pay a fee commensurate with the service needed but could pay a small proportion of it ....
Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law, supra note 140, at 212.
144. Administrative difficulties become apparent in a characterization of procedures
by which the determination of indigency is made in Cook County:
The typical indigent defendant will be brought to court for arraignment with
perhaps 50 other inmates of the county jail. He will await his turn for arraignment in a jail area immediately adjacent to the courtroom. When his case is
called, he will appear before the presiding judge without counsel. The judge
will ask him: "Do you have a lawyer?" If he answers "no," the judge will
then ask: "Do you have money to hire a lawyer?" If the defendant says he
does not, the court says: "Then I appoint the public defender to represent
you."

Defense of the Poor in Illinois, supra note 142, at 217. Although an affidavit filed by
the indigent defendant desiring counsel which contains sufficient information to permit
the court to ascertain his assets and liabilities is a statutory requirement, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 113-3 (1973), studies indicate that this procedure is rarely followed. See, e.g.,
Defense of the Poor in Illinois, supra note 142, at 217-19; A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
supra note 140, at 82-83.
145. An impoverished accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of means.
A problem arises for the system of criminal justice when at any stage of the
proceedings a lack of means in the accused substantially inhibits or prevents the
proper assertion of a right or a claim of right.
REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrrTEE,

supra note 140, at 8.

146. Note, Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the
Law and the Constitution, 22 VAND. L. REv. 611, 628 n.75 (1969).
147. The subject of bail administration is beyond the scope of this article.' This subject is treated in REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE, supra note 140,
at 58-89; A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 140, at 95-108; Silverstein, Bail in
the State Courts-A Field Study and Report, 50 MINN. L. REV. 621 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Bail in the State Courts]; Comment, Indigent Court Costs and Bail, supra note
17; Note, The Administration of Illinois Bail Provisions: An Empirical Study of Four
Downstate Counties, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 341 [hereinafter cited as The Administration of Illinois Bail Provisions].
148. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110 (1973).
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ing from a judgment for a fine or costs be satisfied from the amount of
money on deposit in the court in the form of a bail bond. 4 ' The
mandatory language of the statute precludes a separate determination of present ability to pay or of subsequent hardship on the defendant
and his family. Consequently, the rationale must be that the defendant capable of posting bond, whether or not counsel was provided for
him, is not indigent for purposes of satisfying assessed costs.
This rationale is consistent with the definition of indigent status as
inability to bear the obligation under consideration or to purchase the
necessary service. Commentators universally agree that ability to post
bond is not dispositive of the question of indigency for purposes of
appointment of counsel, 150 and the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted
this position.' 5 ' If the defendant capable of posting bond may be
found indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel, conversely
then the defendant financially incapable of engaging his own attorney may be found not indigent if his money is on deposit in the
court and readily available to be applied in satisfaction of a judgment
for costs.' 5 ' Adoption of this reasoning process precludes the assertion of equal protection violations in this practice: the defendant
deemed not indigent is simply obliged to discharge the same liability
for costs arising upon every judgment of conviction.
The flaw in this reasoning is its implicit presumption that funds deposited in the court in order to secure release on bond are the property solely of the defendant. It is an uncontestable fact, however,
that a large proportion of accuseds are financially unable to meet
pecuniary requirements for bail, 5 a so that their pre-trial release
through bail procedures is effected solely through the generosity of
friends and relatives. Can a defendant be deemed not indigent if his
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(h) provides:
After a judgment for a fine and court costs or either is entered in the prosecution of a cause in which a deposit had been made in accordance with subsec-

tion (a) the balance of such deposit, after deduction of bail bond costs, shall

be applied to the payment of the judgment.
150. PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 142, at 55; FinancialStatus of an Accused, supra note 140, at 874-75. One commentator has suggested that use of ability
to post bond as a test to determine eligibility for court appointed counsel may infringe
equal protection by denying counsel to the indigent person whose friend or relative acts
as surety, while granting counsel to the indigent who remains in jail. Bail in the State
Courts, supra note 147, at 645.
151. People v. Eggers, 27 Ill. 2d 85, 188 N.E.2d 30 (1963); People v. Whitney, 24
Ill. App. 3d 685, 321 N.E.2d 317 (1974) (abstract opinion).
152. This conclusion is premised upon the fact that costs involve relatively minimal

amounts in comparison with the sums required to hire an attorney. As currently assessed, costs of prosecution in Cook County will rarely exceed $150. See APPENDIX.
153. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENER&L's COMMnITEE, supra note 140, at 67; The
Administration of Illinois Bail Provisions, supra note 147, at 382.
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visible sources of wealth consist of money supplied by others?

Although Illinois courts have not yet resolved this precise issue,
opinions of other jurisdictions generally indicate that the legality of the

application of cash bail to the satisfaction of fines or costs is a matter
governed by statute.' 5 4

Scrutiny of the particular statute involved

must therefore precede a determination of whether a generous friend
or relative of the accused may be deprived of funds advanced for bail
by application of those funds to a judgment for costs. By its terms,
the Illinois bail statute indulges in a conclusive presumption that
funds deposited in the court in lieu of bail are the property of the defendant by requiring that the accused himself deposit the funds, 5 5 and
by directing in express terms that such moneys in excess of amounts
applied to satisfy a fine or costs' 58 be returned to the accused himself.15 7 The statute does not contemplate inquiry into the source of
the funds received under its terms. So long as a deposit is made in
compliance with the statute, 158 the depositor is presumed to be cognizant of the statutory provisions. 5 9 This construction of the Illinois bail
statute effectively dissolves the possibility of assertion of equal protection violations: if the defendant posts bond with "his" money, he is
deemed not indigent. 60
154. See cases collected at Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 1084 (1963).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(a) (1973). The statute provides:
The person for whom bail has been set shall execute the bail bond and deposit
with the clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of
money equal to 10% of the bail, but in no event shall such deposit be less
than $25.
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(h). The text of this statute is set forth at note
149 supra.
157. ILL. RPv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(f) (1973). The statute provides:
When the conditions of the bail bond have been performed and the accused
has been discharged from all obligations in the cause the clerk of the court
shall return to the accused, unless the court orders otherwise, 90% of the sum
which had been deposited and shall retain as bail bond costs 10% of the
amount deposited. However, in no event shall the amount retained by the
clerk as bail bond costs be less than $5.
At the request of the defendant the court may order such 90% of defendant's
bail deposit, or whatever amount repayable to defendant from such deposit, to
be paid to defendant's attorney of record.
158. When any party other than the defendant makes the deposit for him, it is
a deposit in compliance with the statute, and the money is thus devoted to the
purposes of the statute, and to the use of the defendant.
People ex rel. Gilbert v. Laidlaw, 102 N.Y. 588, 592, 7 N.E. 910, 913 (1886). See
also State v. Ross, 100 Tenn. 303, 45 S.W. 673 (1898); Kaspar v. State, 206 Tenn. 445,
333 S.W.2d 934 (1967).
159. People ex rel. Gilbert v. Laidlaw, 102 N.Y. 588, 7 N.E. 910 (1886).
160. Opinions holding that the defendant need not affirmatively establish the financial incapability of his family and friends to bear costs, as well as his own indigency,
are not in conflict with the operation of this presumption. See, e.g., State v. Vallejos,
87 Ariz. 119, 348 P.2d 554 (1960) (defendant need not prove the indigency of his family and friends in order to be found unable to purchase a transcript for appellate purposes); Knapp v. Hardy, 111 Ariz. 107, 523 P.2d 1308 (1974) (defendant need not establish his mother's indigency in order to qualify for appointed counsel). See also Po-
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Disturbingly narrow and artificial as this construction of the statute may be, it is difficult to make out a claim that the accused's
equal protection rights have been infringed when funds donated by
friends or relatives are applied in satisfaction of costs. The accused
has secured pre-trial release and upon conviction his debt to the state
in the form of a judgment for costs is merely transformed into a debt
to his benefactor. Certainly the accused may not vindicate the
depositor's claim to the funds applied to the judgment for costs by
asserting that his own rights have been violated.
Nor can statutory preclusion of inquiry into the source of cash deposited in lieu of bail be attacked as irrational or arbitrary. Although the identity of the owner of the funds deposited could conceivably be ascertained by requiring that such information be stated
by affidavit at the time bail bond is executed, the twMi prospect of
fraudulent attempts to transfer ownership of the funds and subsequent
recurring disputes as to whose money was actually deposited may
become a disturbing reality. A legislative decision to forestall such
administrative difficulties by stifling potential sources of chaos can6
not be termed wholly capricious.' '
DUE PROCESS

"Due process" is, perhaps the least frozen concept of our lawthe least confined to history and, the most
absorptive of powerful
62
social standards of a progressive society.'
A social scheme which included no consistent, systemized procedural context within which the exercise of rights and the fulfillment of
duties was safeguarded would be intolerable. The centrality of the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process is paramount, for:
Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights,
neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the
VIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 142, at 53-54. This denial of access to a phase
of the criminal process solely on the basis of the accused's inability to demonstrate the

impecuniousness of his friends and relatives is distinguished from the application of
funds freely advanced to a judgment for costs rendered only at the conclusion of the
proceeding. If the defendant is unable to pay the costs which accrue upon a judgment
of conviction, clearly his friends and relatives are not legally obligated to act as sureties.
The defendant who benefits from the generosity of others is not, however, discriminatorily refused a necessary service which the state is constitutionally obligated to provide.
161. Surely the harsh effects of this procedure, such as the deterrence of relatives
and friends from the initial advancement of bail money renders its wisdom and social
utility questionable. Such distasteful results, however, are inherent in the administration
of the bail system, a topic discussed in the references cited in note 147 supra. The constitutionailty of certain aspects of the bail system is extensively discussed in Schilb v.
Kuebel, 46 Ill. 2d 538, 264 N.E.2d 377 (1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
162. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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State's monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution
could hardly be said to be acceptable .... 163
Procedural due process guarantees preclude not only curtailment of
access'" to the judicial process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be
heard,""5 but also the imposition of burdens which needlessly chill
the exercise of constitutional rights. A determination of whether obliging an offender, upon conviction, to reimburse the state for expenses
specially incurred in his prosecution offends due process requirements
necessitates resolution of two questions. 6 '
Does Knowledge That Prosecution Costs Will Be Imposed in the
Event of Conviction Unduly Burden the Accused's Exercise of
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights?
The seminal United States Supreme Court opinion, United States v.
Jackson,'67 held that governmental practices whose sole objective is discouragement of assertion of a constitutional right are patently unconstitutional. In that case, an indictment charging the defendant with
violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act 168 was dismissed by the district court' on the ground that the Act was wholly unconstitutional
in that, by vesting sole authority in the jury to inflict the death penalty upon a finding of guilt, it required that the accused risk loss of life
as the price for assertion of the right to trial by jury. The Supreme
Court agreed, finding that, while the legislative objective of removing
the decision to inflict the death penalty from the discretion of the
trial court was legitimate, that objective could not permissibly be implemented by means which needlessly chilled the exercise of fundamental rights:
The question is not whether the chilling effect is "incidental"
163. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
164. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
165. Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
166. The due process question involved here is not denial of access to the judicial
process. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Nor is it a denial of the
means with which to vindicate one's rights. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Imposing prosecution costs at the point of conviction neither negates one's right to trial in the first instance nor influences the basic fairness of the trial which precedes the judgment. The
focus is rather in determining whether an accused's foreknowledge that prosecution costs
will accrue in the event of his conviction is a needless and undue inducement to waive
his fifth amendment right to plead not guilty and his sixth amendment right to trial and
to consideration of the evidence by a jury of his peers.
167. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1967).
169. 262 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
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rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.' 7 0
The Supreme Court, however, has receded from application of this
broad mandate in subsequent cases 171 where the defendant contended
that his right to assert constitutional guarantees had been chilled.
The scope of the principle which formed the basis of the Jackson
holding was thus restricted:
Jackson did not hold, as subsequent decisions have made clear, that
the Constitution forbids every government-imposed choice in the
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise
of constitutional rights. 172
The question becomes then, one addressed to the voluntariness of the
choice ultimately made by the defendant, rather than to the impact
of governmental practices in inducing that choice.
In every case subsequent to Jackson, the Court has refused to address the merits of claimed constitutional deprivations raised under the
Jackson principle which occurred prior to the entry of a guilty plea. 78
Instead, the Court has concluded in each case that the issue was not
the respective merits of the constitutional claims as such, but rather
whether the guilty plea had been made intelligently and voluntarily
74
with the advice of competent counsel.'
The aggregate effect of these cases expatiating the Jackson principle is as follows: imposition of a burden tantamount to a chilling
effect upon the defendant's assertion of a constitutional right is insufficient to invalidate, on constitutional grounds, a guilty plea which
is voluntary, in view of the relevant surrounding circumstances and
supported by adequate factual basis. 17 5 In such circumstances, the
170.
171.

172.

390 U.S. at 582 (1968).

See cases cited in note 173 infra.

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973).

173. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (an otherwise valid guilty plea
was not involuntary because induced by the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if defendant had chosen a jury trial); North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

(the fact that a defendant would not have

pleaded guilty except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty did not necessarily

demonstrate that the plea was not the product of a free and rational choice); Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (defendant's plea of guilty found supported by substantial evidence of voluntariness, even though defendant was indicted under the same
Federal Kidnapping Act discussed in Jackson, and premised his appeal on the Jackson
rationale). See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), discussing the scope of the Jackson holding.

174.

The topic of the voluntariness of guilty pleas is beyond the scope of this article.

For a discussion of factors that may justify a reduction in penalty upon a plea of guilty,
see ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved
Draft 1968) 37-52; A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE AccusED, supra note 140, at
53-57.
175. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487 (1962); Kerchival v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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proper issue for judicial consideration is not the degree to which the
defendant's rights were chilled, but rather, in the totality of circumstances, whether his waiver of those rights represents a voluntary and
17 6
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available.
That state practice may be a factor in motivating a plea of guilty
177
does not detract from its voluntariness.
Thus, despite the constitutional soundness of the Jackson principle
that the state may not impair the exercise of constitutional rights by
extracting such a price for that exercise that the will to assert the
rights is chilled, as expatiated in subsequent cases, it is difficult to
postulate a context in relation to the issue under discussion where
the principle is applicable. Assume hypothetically that defendant, indicted for an offense, chooses to enter a plea of guilty. If the defendant does not inform the court at the time he pleads that his plea
is induced by the prospect of more substantial costs accruing during
the course of the trial, 178 he is precluded from raising whatever chilling effect the -costs assessment provisions exerted on his fifth and
sixth amendment rights as an issue on appeal. Under the ParkerAlford-Brady 7 ' reasoning, the appellate court may properly consider
solely the voluntariness of the defendant's plea, and such voluntariness is unaffected by the fact that the prospect of liability for costs induced the defendant to plead guilty, so long as the defendant, desirous of avoiding further costs liability, freely chose that alternative
over others available. The voluntariness of the plea is not influenced
by identification of one factor as a sine qua non cause of the plea,
absent coercion.180 On the other hand, should the defendant attempt
to demonstrate coercion by announcing to the court at the time of his
plea that his decision to waive his fifth and sixth amendment rights
176.

177.

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).

In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970), the Court declared:

The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step
in the criminal process. For some people, their breach of a State's law is alone
sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For

others, apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar
them into admitting their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may convince the defendant and his counsel that a trial
is not worth the agony and expense to the defendant and his family. All these
pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State's responsibility for some of the
factors motivating the pleas; the pleas are no more improperly compelled than
is the decision by a defendant at the close of the State's evidence at trial that
he must take the stand or face certain conviction.
178. If the defendant chose to be tried by the court, the only additional costs are
a $10 fee for each day of trial for the state's attorney, and a service mileage fee of 80

per mile for the sheriff. A jury trial would cause the following additional items to accrue: jury demand, $50; summoning jurors, $2 per juror.
179.

See note 173 supra.

180.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

376

1975

Prosecution Costs

is grounded in his desire to avoid liability for further costs, the court
would be bound, in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule
402,1 to reject the plea and put the defendant to trial."8 2
Thus, the principle of Jackson, although presumably still constitutionally sound, has been rendered virtually ineffectual through subsequent refinement and cannot, therefore, form the basis for an argument that the mere prospect of liability for prosecution costs in
the event of conviction is an undue burden which substantially chills
the exercise of fifth and sixth amendment rights.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Fuller v. Oregon'8 3 recently
rejected the contention that a defendant's knowledge that he may remain under an obligation to repay the expenses incurred in providing him legal representation might impel him to decline the services of
an appointed counsel and thus chill his constitutional right to counsel.
The Court distinguished recoupment statutes, which permissibly serve
a valid state interest in conservation of public moneys, from statutes
which function solely to chill the exercise of constitutional rights by
inflicting penalties upon the assertion of these rights, and held that
recoupment statutes impose no undue burden upon the exercise of
constitutional rights, so long as the obligation to recompense the state
84
is enforced only against defendants capable of meeting it.'
Further discussion, however, in terms of the question at issue, is
precluded by the operative inadequacy and unintelligibility of the existing Illinois statutory provisions for costs assessment. Although it is
conclusive that incarceration for involuntary default in costs payment
is impossible under Illinois law, 18 5 there is no statutory requirement
of a determination regarding the present ability of the offender to
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1IOA, § 402 (1973).
182. This hypothetical situation must be contrasted to the procedural context of
Jackson, where the defendant moved to quash the indictment under which he was
charged on the constitutional grounds discussed. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). Clearly, since
a defendant could not be indicted for violation of the costs assessment provisions, this
context could not arise in Illinois.
183. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
184. But see In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969),
holding that any reimbursement requirement constitutes an impediment to the free exercise of constitutional rights. See also State v. Young, 21 N.C. App. 316, 204 S.E.2d 185
(1974); State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676, 521 P.2d 706 (1974); Opinion
of the Justices, 109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500 (1969). The United States Supreme Court
discussed and specifically dismissed the holdings of these cases, concluding that such reasoning was "wide of the constitutional mark." Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51-52
(1974). See also People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 523 P.2d 1173, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765
(1974), holding that a recoupment statute which conditioned reimbursement upon a judicial determination of present ability to pay imposed no burden on the defendant's constitutional rights.
185. For discussion of the reasoning impelling this conclusion, see pp. 354-62 supra.
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satisfy a judgment for costs.""' Arguably, such a determination is
implicit in the operation of the enforcement procedures, whereby
the offender is obligated to pay, but no penalties inure in the event
of involuntary default. However, the predicament of an offender
who possesses few visible assets and is financially incapable of
wholly satisfying the costs assessment immediately upon judgment remains uncertain in two respects: procedures by which the defendant
may satisfactorily demonstrate his current impecuniousness are nowhere apparent in the statutory scheme of enforcement provisions,
and the duration of the lien which attaches at the time of his indictment and continues upon default cannot be determined.
It is strongly suggested that potential due process contentions that
undue burden and chilling of rights proceeding from the operation of
the costs assessment provisions be alleviated by re-enacting the statute to clearly exclude those offenders who demonstrate present inability to bear a judgment for costs, while safeguarding the state's interest in conserving the resources of its coffers by retaining the lien
protection, but limiting its operative duration. Only a clear statutory
mandate that only those offenders financially capable of liquidating
a judgment for costs are required to recompense the state authoritatively precludes any due process claims of undue impediments of the
exercise of constitutional rights.
Is a Jury Tax Properly Assessable?
A corollary to the issue of state-induced chill upon the exercise of
constitutional rights is the question of the propriety of the inclusion of
certain expenses' 8 7 as costs of the prosecution which proceeds from a
In Ilcriminal defendant's right to be tried by a jury of his peers.'
linois, these expenses, a jury-demand fee and a fee for swearing jurors, are in the nature of a tax, assessed as part of the fee for services
performed by the sheriff'8 9 and circuit clerk.1"'
186.

Cf. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).

See text accompanying notes 183

through 184 supra.

187. The State's Attorney's Office of Cook County currently taxes a jury-demand fee
of $50 as compensation to the circuit clerk and a fee for swearing jurors in the amount
of $2 per juror as compensation to the sheriff. See APPENDIX.
188. The subject of the right to trial by jury in criminal proceedings is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Donnelly, The Defendant's Right to Waive Jury
Trial in Criminal Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 247 (1956); Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes,
23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1966); Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability
of Conviction, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971); Note, Jury Trials in Criminal
Prosecutions: "Freedom Lives," 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 340 (1971).
189. ILL. REv. STAT. oh. 53, § 71 (1973).
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 31.1 (1973).
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Whether these expenses are constitutionally taxable to the offender
as costs of the prosecution is a question of first impression in Illinois; however, the Illinois Supreme Court has affirmed the constitu19 1
tionality of levying a jury-demand fee as a tax in a civil context,
dismissing contentions that compelling payment of the jury-demand

fee impaired due process rights in terms applicable here:
The constitution does not guarantee to the citizen the right to litigate without expense, but simply protects him from the imposition of such terms as unreasonably and injuriously interfere with
his right to a remedy in the law or impede the due administration
of justice; and that a party who demands a trial by jury should be
required to advance a small jury fee . . . seems no more liable
to a constitutional objection than is the requirement that the fees
192
of the clerk, sheriff and other officers shall be paid ....
From this perspective the jury tax is not in essence distinct from
similar government expenditures taxable to the offender as costs
specially incurred in his prosecution' 9" and is clearly distinguished
from other classes of jury-related expenditures, such as jurors'
per diem and mileage expenses and personal fees, which are
inherent in the maintenance and operation of government and not
properly assessable against the defendant.' 9 4 By predicating enforce191. Fried v. Danaher, 46 Ill. 2d 475, 263 N.E.2d 820 (1970).
192. Id. at 479, 263 N.E.2d at 822 (1970) (citations omitted).
193. Characterization of a jury-demand fee in criminal cases as indistinct from other
costs and fees levied upon the convicted defendant on the basis of procedures deemed
applicable in civil cases does not negate cognizance of the essentially different functions
served by juries in civil and criminal cases. In addition to the fact-finding role performed by civil juries, criminal juries function as "an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). The question, however, focuses upon
the exercise without undue burden of sixth amendment rights to trial and fifth amendment due process rights, rather than upon the inviolability accorded the exercise of the
right to trial by jury. If assessment of other classes of trial-related expenses does not
unduly burden the exercise of the right to trial in the first instance, imposition of a jury
tax upon a defendant adjudged financially able to satisfy the obligation does not further
contravene fundamental rights.
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 53, § 62 (1973) clearly obligates the county to bear per
diem, mileage and personal expenses of jurors in Illinois. The State's Attorney's Office
of Cook County initially attempted to include these jury-related expenses in a demand
for judgment for costs of the prosecution in People v. Hickman, supra note 15. This
attempt was judicially rebuffed, and such expenses are currently not assessed in Cook

County. See

APPENDIX.

Precedent from other jurisdictions regarding the propriety of taxing jury-demand fees
as a cost of the prosecution is of little value; courts concern themselves only with the
propriety of taxing to the offender personal jurors' fees, per diem and mileage and assume that the jury-demand fee is a properly taxable item. See, e.g., Saunders v. People,
63 Colo. 241, 165 P. 781 (1917). Interestingly, in discussing the issue of the propriety
of saddling the offender with jurors' personal fees, even courts whose opinions express
doubt as to the constitutionality of this practice consistently recede from approaching
the issue on constitutional grounds. No court, to date, has actually declared the practice
of obliging defendants to bear the costs of various jury expenses, such as meals and lodging, per diem and fees, unconstitutional. The approach utilized is rather to construe the
phrase "costs of the prosecution" to exclude such personal jurors' expenses. See, e.g.,
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ment of liability for jury-related taxes, as well as all other expenditures properly deemed costs of the prosecution upon a judicial determination of the present ability of the offender to satisfy the judgment
for costs, inhibitory effects upon the exercise of constitutional rights is
minimized.
CONCLUSION

We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or desirable, or
"whether it is based on assumptions scientifically substantiated."
Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional. . . . Our task,
however, is not to weigh this statute's effectiveness but its constitutionality. Whether the returns under the statute justify the expense,
time, and efforts of state officials is for the ongoing supervision of
the legislative branch.19 5
Notwithstanding probable minimal adequacy on constitutional
grounds, the existing statutory procedures for costs assessment and enforcement remain anachronistic, unintelligible, riddled with surface
contradiction regarding possible incarceration of defaulting offenders
and precariously close to unconstitutionality on due process
grounds. The social utility and effectiveness of inflicting prosecution
costs upon convicted defendants is a purely legislative determination.
If it be legislatively ordained that amounts actually realized are not
negligible when balanced against administrative time and resources
expended in their collection, then the following suggestions for reenactment of the costs assessment provisions are submitted:
(1) Notice of potential liability for costs, in the event of conviction,
must be afforded the accused. Such notice must include a statement
of the items, and their amounts, which are properly taxable, as well
as an explanation that, in the event of conviction, immediate enforcement of costs obligations will occur only if it is judicially determined
that the accused possesses the financial capability to satisfy the judgment. Although the obligation to so inform the accused may be
delegated to defense counsel, it is suggested that this duty be incorporated as a function of the court at the preliminary examination.
(2) Statutory language must be clarified, repealing anachronistic
United States v. Murphy, 59 F.2d 734 (S.D. Ala. 1934); Gleckman v. United States,
80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935); Arnold v. State, 76 Wy. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957); State
v. Hanson, 92 Idaho 665, 448 P.2d 758 (1968). Contra Kincaid v. Commonwealth,
200 Va. 341, 105 S.E.2d 846 (1958); State v. Thomson, 188 Kan. 171, 360 P.2d 871
(1961).
195. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1972) (citations omitted).
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sections and specifically detailing the precise items taxable as costs
of the prosecution.
(3) Enforcement procedures must be specifically set forth, and their
implementation must be predictated upon judicial determination of
present ability to satisfy a judgment without inducing manifest hardship. This procedure may be accomplished, with a minimum of administrative difficulty, by affidavit at the sentencing hearing, or at
the time sentence is imposed. The court must be granted discretion
to implement and modify methods of payment.
(4) The judgment lien must be statutorily limited in duration to a
term of 7 years from its inception at indictment. Although it is eminently feasible that an offender adjudged indigent at the time of judgment may later fortuitously realize means of repayment, an interminable lien is excessive and unnecessary to advancement of the
state's interest in shielding its coffers. Administrative costs of incessant investigation of the offender to ascertain whether he had subsequently acquired property subject to the judgment lien would substantially outbalance the amounts realizable under the costs assessment provisions.
A proposed statute incorporating these suggestions is submitted:
§ 1

Judgment for Costs

When any person is convicted of an offense, the court shall give
judgment that the offender pay the costs of the prosecution. The
court shall inform the defendant at the preliminary examination that,
in the event of conviction, judgment for the costs of the prosecution
will issue. The court shall further inform the defendant as to the
nature of such costs, as hereinafter provided.
§ 2

Allowable Costs

Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state in
prosecuting the offender. Such costs will not include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial or expenditures related to the maintenance and operation of government agencies that will be made by the public irrespective of specific violations
of law.'" 6 Costs of the prosecution shall include only those costs and
fees as hereinafter provided.
196.

Based on OR. REv. STAT. 161.665(2) (1973).
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§ 3

1 97
State's Attorney-Fees

State's attorneys shall be entitled to the following fees:
For each conviction in a prosecution on an indictment for a felony, $30.
For each conviction in other cases tried in the circuit court, $5.
For preliminary examination of each defendant held to bail or recognizance, $5.
For each case of appeal to the Supreme or Appellate Court when
prosecuted or defended by him, $50.
For each day actually employed in the trial of a case, $10.
For each case of forfeited recognizance where the forfeiture is set aside
at the instance of the defense, in addition to the ordinary costs, $10
for each defendant.
For each proceeding in a circuit court to inquire intQ the alleged
mental incompetence of any person, $5 for each defendant.
For each proceeding in a circuit court to inquire into the alleged dependency or delinquency of any child, $10.
For each proceeding involving a case of habeas corpus, $20.
In cases of inquiry into the mental incompetence of any person alleged
to be mentally ill and in cases of appeal in the Supreme or Appellate
Court, where judgment is in favor of the accused, no costs shall be
assessed against the accused.
§ 4

Sheriff-Fees9 8

For serving any writ of summons on each defendant, $4.
For serving a subpoena on each witness, $3.
For swearing jurors, $2 per juror.
Mileage for service of all process, 80 per mile each way necessarily
traveled in making such service computed from the place of holding
court.
For attending before a judge with a prisoner on writ of habeas corpus, $3.50 per day.
For discharging each prisoner from jail, $2.
§ 5

199
Circuit Clerk-Fees

For each jury demand, $50.
For filing a complaint, $30.
197.

Substantial portions excerpted from ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 53, § 8 (1973).

Substantial portions excerpted from ILL. REV.

STAT.
STAT.

ch. 53, § 31.1 (1973).

198. Substantial portions excerpted from ILL. REV.
199.
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ch. 53, § 71 (1973).

1975

Prosecution Costs

For filing an appearance, $12.
For filing a motion to vacate judgment, $10.
§ 6

Proceeding To Determine FinancialCapability

In all cases where the court gives judgment that the offender pay the
costs of prosecution and the offender claims he is without funds to
satisfy all or a portion of such costs, the court shall conduct a proceeding to determine the present ability of the defendant to pay all
or a portion of the costs. The court shall require an affidavit
signed by the offender containing sufficient information to determine
the assets and liabilities of the offender. If the court determines that
the offender has the present ability to pay all or a portion of the costs,
the court shall order the costs to be paid forthwith or within a specified period of time or in installments. The court may, upon a showing
of good cause, including manifest hardship to the offender or his immediate family, modify the method or time of payment.
§ 7

Judgment Lien on Property, Real and Personal-Execution0 0

(a) The property, real and personal, not otherwise exempt from execution or attachment, of every person convicted of any offense, shall
be bound, and a lien shall be created on the property of every such
offender from the time of indictment, but only so far as will be sufficient to pay the costs of prosecution.
(b) Acquittal of the person charged with the commission of an offense shall operate to discharge the lien.
(c) Payment in full of the costs of prosecution by any person convicted of an offense or by any person in his favor shall operate
to discharge the lien.
(d) In any case where the court determines that a person convicted
of an offense is without present financial ability to pay all or a portion of the costs of prosecution, the lien created shall continue upon all
property, real and personal, not otherwise exempt from execution or
attachment, possessed by the offender at the time of indictment, for a
period of seven (7) years. If, at any time during the seven (7) year
period, it is determined that the offender possesses sufficient property
to satisfy the judgment for costs of the prosecution, the clerk of the
court in which the conviction was had shall issue an execution for all
costs of prosecution remaining unpaid.
200.

Modifies ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-4 (1973).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 6: 345

(e) In the event of default in the payment of costs of the prosecution or in any installment, the clerk of the court in which the conviction
was had shall upon expiration of thirty (30) days after default in the
payment of costs or in any installment, unless the offender shows that
his default was not due to a failure on his part to make a good faith
effort to pay, issue an execution for all costs of the prosecution
remaining unpaid.

(f) The execution may be directed to the proper officer of any
county in this State. The officer to whom such execution is delivered
shall levy the same upon all the estate, real and personal, of the defendant, not otherwise exempt from execution, as stated in the execution. The property so levied upon shall be advertised and sold in
the same manner as in civil cases, with like rights reserved to all

parties that may be interested therein.
TEREE

E.

FOSTER

Author's note:
In a memorandum order dated May 16, 1975, Cook County Circuit Court trial Judge
Marvin E. Aspen ruled this cost statute void on its face as inducing an unconstitutionally
chilling effect upon a criminal defendant's exercise of 14th amendment rights, and in
its application, noting that, contrary to the mandatory language of the statute, costs assessment currently proceeds on an ad hoc basis which varies according to the court
and the particular assistant state's attorney trying the offender. Judge Aspen recommended that a more particularly drafted costs assessment statute be enacted by the
Legislature. The Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County has indicated that
these issues will be raised before Illinois reviewing courts.
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APPENDIX
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff,

))

V.

CASE NUMBER:

)

, Defendant
ORDER ASSESSING FINES FEES AND COSTS
This cause having been concluded by a final order of Judgment, the following are
hereby allowed and taxed as costs herein:
I$ I I
FINES
CIRCUIT CLERK

i$

FILING COMPLAINT @ $30.00

__

APPEARANCE @ $12.00
-MOTION

I1

I
I$
I

TO VACATE JUDGMENT

@ $10.00

1

is

I

1$
I

JURY DEMAND @ $50.00

1

I

I
1 1
ICLERK
I$

1I

TOTAL

SHERIFF
SUMMONS ON DEFENDANT @ $4.00

is

I1

_

SUBPOENA @ $3.00

is

I

_

SUMMONING JUROR @ $2.00/JUROR

I$

SERVICE MILEAGE @ $0.08/MILE

i$

ATTENDING H. C. PRISONER @ $3.50/DAY

s-I

__
_

__

I
1

1
1I 1$

1

1

MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION @ $5.00

i$
is

PRELIMINARY HEARING @ $5.00

1$

1

1

APPEAL @ $50.00

is I1

EACH DAY OF TRIAL @ $10.00

1$

1

1

REINSTATEMENT OF BFW @ $10.00

1$

1

1

COMPETENCY HEARING @ $5.00

i$

STATE'S ATTORNEY
FELONY CONVICTION @ $30.00
__
__

I1

i$

DISCHARGING PRISONER FROM
JAIL @ $2.00

__

1

DEPENDENCY/DELINQUENCY
HEARING @ $10.00
HABEAS CORPUS HEARING @ $20.00
_
GRAND TOTAL FINE, FEES AND COSTS

1

I

SHERIFF
1 TOTAL

I1

1

$ I$
$ I1

STATES AlITY
I TOTAL
I
1
1$

I1

Judgment is hereby entered against Defendant for above. Execution may issue.
The Clerk is hereby directed to deduct payment of foregoing from any cash bail
posted herein, to extent possible.
Other Orders:
AMOUNT OF BOND

ENTER:

DEFICIENCY, IF ANY

JUDGE:

, 197-
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